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第二章では、前期の長編小説『アダム・ビード』(Adam Bede, 1859) と『フロス河の








 第三章では、前期の短編小説「とばりの彼方」(“The Lifted Veil,” 1859)を取り上げ、透
視能力と予知能力という二種類の超能力を持つ主人公の非現実的な設定や、彼の共感の行
為を分析する。スミスの同感論では、他者の心理を直接経験することはできない人間は、














































The Meaning and Power of Sympathy in George Eliot’s Fiction 
 
This thesis examines George Eliot’s conception of sympathy by conducting a 
close textural analysis of her demonstration of the mechanisms of sympathy from her 
early to her late novels. Sympathy, for Eliot, is one of the most significant facets of her 
aesthetic as well as philosophical concern throughout her career. In attempting to 
analyze Eliot’s conception of sympathy, we must note that “sympathy” is not a simple 
term. The term “sympathy” has been variously defined and employed with diverse 
meanings, keeping in step with the times. Though numerous studies have attempted to 
grasp what surrounds the term, “sympathy” is still vaguely defined, used, as it is, with 
multiple combinations or mixtures of its meanings. In Eliot’s case, she articulates 
various forms of sympathy in every piece such that her conception of sympathy can be 
considered to be both moral and amoral. In examining the complexity of it, I would 
like mainly to refer to the system of sympathy as defined by Adam Smith, the 
eighteenth century British economist and moral philosopher who dedicated much of 
his work to the formation of the concept of sympathy, which had a huge influence 
especially on the Victorian moral philosophy. Despite Smith’s direct or indirect 
intellectual influence on Eliot, her conception of sympathy seems to be more subtle 
and complicated than Smith’s system in his Theory of Moral Sentiments.  
There are two main critical streams in the analysis of Eliot’s idea of sympathy. 
One view is to regard it as one of the fundamental elements which constitutes a basis 
for her morality. The other opinion is a skeptical one that the sympathy delineated by 
Eliot may be inadequate for her moral code. The difference between these opposing 
viewpoints lies in the critical emphasis of the psychological mechanism of sympathy. 
Critics who claim that Eliot’s sympathy is a base for her ethics pay attention to the 
intellectual function of sympathy, the ability to understand the personal and social 
feelings of others. Critics who have the opposing view put an emphasis on the 
emotional effects of sympathy because they express our initial reactions to particular 
situations. There is no doubt that the formation of Eliot’s idea of sympathy owes much 
to the authors who she read and was influenced by. Elizabeth Ermarth explains the 
psychic mechanism of Eliot’s sympathy using Ludwig Feuerbach’s psychological 
analyses of the act of prayer in The Essence of Christianity. According to Ermarth, 
one’s self-exploration and self-analysis is essential in order to be able to recognize 
one’s self-division as well as the differences between oneself and others. She argues 
that this ability is one of the most crucial facets of understanding the idea of Eliot’s 
sympathy. Ermarth’s unique view, which makes a contrast from the traditional, lexical 
implication of sympathy that is related to similarity or the sameness, puts an emphasis 
on the difference rather than similarity. In order to carefully analyze one’s own psyche 
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as well as the emotional gap between oneself and another, one needs an objective 
insight which judges what is valid and just, avoiding standing in an overly subjective 
position. This imperturbable insight is what Smith has discussed in his Theory of 
Moral Sentiments. Though Smith’s moral philosophy is essential when considering the 
Romantic and Victorian sympathy, there are not many critics who have applied Smith’s 
theory to the analysis of George Eliot’s conception of sympathy. Smith’s discussion is, 
however, reasonably valid if we are to deeply read Eliot’s texts, as she sometimes 
writes in Smithian diction, and she must have shared the spirit of the time when the 
intellectuals earnestly discussed the idea of Victorian altruism and benevolence which 
had been profoundly influenced by Smith and other moral philosophers. Chapter 1 
discusses this implicit but significant connection between Eliot and Smith.  
Chapter 2 examines Eliot’s demonstration of how sympathy is inseparable from 
one’s “Romantic” egoism. I mainly refers to Pyle’s argument that Adam Bede and The 
Mill on the Floss describes the “Romantic” concept of imagination. Developing Pyle’s 
discussion, I focus on analyzing Dinah’s and Maggie’s sympathy, based on their 
“Romantic imagination” rather than the Smithian imagination and its moral problem 
that Eliot proposes. The heroines’ “painful collisions” that come from the discrepancy 
between the inward and the outward is always invoked by the characters’ desire, which 
is deepened and recognized by their acts of “Romantic imagination,” which are 
themselves their desires. Eliot implicates that sympathy produced by Romantic 
imagination cannot fully be cut off from egoistic feeling. Behind Dinah and Maggie’s 
sympathy, there exists a fear of violating their personal principles. This fear is created 
by the Romantic imagination, which they share. Their sympathy, under the Romantic 
conflict, has a function of manipulating them not to overstep their own moral 
principles for which they would be punished with internal torment. Thus their 
sympathy, aroused to avoid the feelings of self-inflicted terror, can be regarded as an 
egoistic sentiment. Dinah’s and Maggie’s Romantic fear is developed in Gwendolen’s 
plot in Daniel Deronda, who suffers from a terrible sense of “dread” after realizing her 
egoistic purpose to marry her rich husband. Just like Maggie is afraid of being 
punished by her own conscience, Gwendolen is also afraid of her terrible sense of 
guilt.  
Chapter 3 discusses how human egoism is inseparable from the psychological 
mechanism of the act of sympathy, dealing with the novella “The Lifted Veil.” With its 
unique, supernatural setting, in this novella Eliot seems to have tested the nature of 
human sympathy and seeks the answer to the question of whether or not we can 
practice purely disinterested sympathy, completely free from egoism. Endowed with 
the supernatural powers of telepathy and clairvoyance, Latimer can never acquire a 
sympathetic power because of his total egoism and because he has no opportunity to 
use his imagination. Though Eliot gives Latimer a potential sympathy, a power to 
distinguish the feeling towards those who are closer to him from those who are not, 
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which is what Smith discusses in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he confuses his 
imagination with his telepathic view. The almost total lack of opportunity to practice 
his imagination makes him remain an egoistic person who only sees things through his 
subjective view. Latimer’s imperfect sympathy and his utter egoism are seen not only 
in his telepathy but also in his imagination, and his vacillation between his trust and 
distrust of sympathy.  
Chapter 4 examines Eliot’s treatment of the rare example of successful sympathy 
in Silas Marner, the Weaver of Raveloe. The novel demonstrates the successful 
sympathy which has a remedial power that cures the protagonist’s mental pain, saving 
him from the distrust of human relationships by the power of sympathy based on 
affection and memory. I demonstrate this in Silas’s relationship with his adopted child 
Eppie and also with his neighbours. A counter-example of a failing of sympathy 
between a child and her birth father was demonstrated too. These two contrasting 
father-daughter relationships can be better understood within Smith’s discussion of 
sympathetic intimacy. Silas and Eppie’s sympathy with each other is based on a pure 
affection and Smithian “habitual sympathy,” while the sympathy between Godfrey and 
Eppie owes its failure to the fundamental problem of Godfrey’s lack of imagination 
and his single-mindedness, which has nothing to do either with “Romantic” or 
Smithian imagination. Silas Marner seems to confirm Eliot’s fundamental aesthetic 
belief that sympathy based on selfless affection and pure, simple trust in human 
relations has a healing power which can also arouse the reader’s sympathy. 
Chapter 5 discusses two heroes’ failures of sympathy with its limited influential 
power in Felix Holt, the Radical and Daniel Deronda as well as Eliot’s solution to it. 
Those protagonists being naturally noble-minded, have difficulties in constructing a 
proper “emotional concord” necessary for mutual sympathy, which Smith discusses. 
Felix, who has a sincere feeling of fellowship toward the ignorant working-class 
miners, tries to enlighten them by his enthusiastic speeches given in a sympathetic 
tone, but fails miserably again and again in the novel. Ironically, Felix’s 
“fellow-feeling” with the colliers is repeatedly made harder by their vulgarity and lack 
of intelligence. In a politically complicated society, it is very difficult to expect the 
successful construction of sympathy, especially in a community like Treby Magna 
which consists mostly of vulgar people who seek self-love and are lacking in 
self-discipline as Smith argues. Through Felix’s failure of sympathy, the realistic 
limitation of the power of sympathy is presented, though Eliot must have believed its 
small but influential power to make people morally good, as demonstrated in Felix’s 
relationship with Esther, who was full of vanity and had longed for a luxurious life at 
first, but mentally grows, and eventually overcomes her moral weakness under Felix’s 
guidance. As discussed in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Felix Holt shows the harsh 
reality that it is so difficult to sustain the social order, especially in a community, not to 
mention to establish sympathetic relationships between the wise and the ignorant. 
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Through Felix’s positive attitude and in spite of his recognition of reality, we can see 
Eliot’s positive belief in the moral power of sympathy, however little the influence of 
that sympathy is.  
Because of his inward distress caused by the uncertainty of his hidden identity, 
Daniel Deronda artificially controls his sympathy to be unnaturally moral and falls into 
“the danger of sympathy,” which During defines as a false identification of his inner 
voice with his sympathetic words towards others. Daniel’s sympathy is most powerless 
in his interview with his birth mother who utterly rejects Daniel’s filial sympathy. This 
dynamic of failed sympathy between a mother and a son can partly be explained by 
Smith’s viewpoint. Daniel’s tragic recognition of the differences amongst those similar 
to him which he realizes in meeting his mother, and the emotional catharsis he 
experiences, teaches him that there also exists a subtle difference between ideas of 
sameness, which is a deeper and subtler recognition than Ermarth’s definition. This 
teaches him the potency of similarity, which utterly changes his vague form of 
sympathy into one which has more practical power towards those who he really loves 
and supports, however small its influence may be. Felix’s and Daniel’s common 
notions are the clear theme in Eliot’s late novels. 
Reading Adam Bede, The Mill on the Floss, Romola and Middlemarch, chapter 6 
examines Eliot’s conception of her sympathetic imagination, which is distinguished 
neither from the “Romantic” nor the Smithian ideas of imagination. Adam and Philip’s 
“reflective imagination,” which I call Eliot’s idea of sympathetic imagination, makes 
them aware of their past selfishness or moral error, and accept not only their former 
egoistic imagination and misjudgment but also the idea which their previous selves had 
denied. While Pyle regards Eliot’s sympathy as a power of transferal and 
transformation from the Romantic imagination to the less selfish communal 
consciousness, my idea of Eliot’s sympathy includes the whole process of the striving 
endeavour of transformation from the “Romantic” desire and egoism to the more 
objective, disinterested view. This sympathetic imagination operates beyond time and 
space. Eliot’s sympathetic process includes not only the Smithian impartial judgment 
of the validity to be sympathized with based on the agent’s nature, but also on the 
power first to accept the sympathizer’s once-made judgmental mistake, the mistake 
which their previous self must have believed to be right, and then to sympathize with 
the other’s feeling with the newly acquired view.  
Using this multi-dimensional imagination in the imaginative exchange of their 
positions, which Smith says is necessary for sympathy, Romola and Dorothea practice 
sympathetic identification. They do this by changing their persons and characters for 
their “better” or “best” selves. This is for the purpose not only of understanding the 
agent’s sentiments but also of overcoming the subjective egoism and recovering or 
attaining an objective position necessary for their sympathetic actions. Eliot’s 
imaginative identification should be distinguished from that of Smith, within which the 
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imaginary change of circumstances retains our own identities. It is not bound by the 
egoistic self-consciousness or desire, not the Smithian intellectual and emotional 
attempt to gain impartiality though still bound by one’s own identity, but driven by the 
reflective thought and reevaluation of our past misjudgments or misdeeds. All the more 
for the realization of our own previous error, Eliot’s reflective imagination enables us 
to sympathize with people who we once judged as unworthy of our sympathy, or with 
our past selves, and to bring us a new viewpoint of widened and deepened sympathy.  
Tracing Eliot’s long pursuit of the question of human sympathy and analyzing 
her ideal solution to the failure of sympathy in the context of Smith’s philosophy, I 
answer the long-discussed controversy whether Eliot’s idea of sympathy is adequate or 
inadequate for her moral code in the end. My position is that it has much to do with 
Eliot’s moral ethics, based on my natural reading of Eliot’s view, “[i]f Art does not 
enlarge men’s sympathies, it does nothing morally” (The George Eliot Letters 3: 111), 
as well as on my comprehensive textural analyses. My view of Eliot’s conception of 
the ideal sympathy discussed in this thesis does serve as a moral driving force to guide 
the spectator to the selfless, disinterested objective state in order to share the agent’s 
sentiments and thus to help them. However, Eliot’s sympathy is not meant to achieve 
the narrow sense of the Victorian ideological altruism but to attain universal humane 
law as is followed by Antigone. Though I make my position clear, I still admit that 
some of the varieties of her description of sympathy are not enough to define Eliot’s 
moral code precisely, while others have nothing to do with morality at all. Eliot’s 
conception of sympathy, fostered in her philosophical analysis as well as in its 
demonstration in all of her novels, is proved to overcome Smith’s system in the end of 
this thesis. In spite of the difficulty of the all-consuming process of the act of 
sympathy, and the limitations of its influential power, as demonstrated in Dorothea’s 
sympathy, Eliot believes in the human goodness, brought about by the act of sympathy, 
which she purposefully associates with those actions of the ancient noble heroines, so 
as to show its universal and unchangeable moral value. This thesis hopefully reveals 
Eliot’s simple but profound definition of sympathy, “the one poor word which includes 
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2016年 2月 22日午後 2時より口頭試問審査を実施した。まず提出者による論文の概要報
告があり、フロアを含めて質疑応答の時間を持った。その後、公開、非公開の口頭試問を
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